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Transportation Impact of Industry 4.0... 
 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests and speakers, dear colleagues and readers, 
Traditionally, ICTTE 2018 becomes an event which took place to highlight the remarkable 
contribution which transportation makes in so many areas of our lives. 
A glance through the list of papers and presentations planned for the next two days reveals the 
amazing diversity of provided research from the universities and laboratories from 30 countries 
worldwide. 
Nowadays, transport has had a profound impact on the way we live and the ICTTE 2018 is 
pleased to have been a partner in the growth of new technologies, mobility and digitalization era. 
Our key role is to make transportation science and technology available to human wellbeing.  
Conferences such as this provide a valuable opportunity for research scientists, industry 
specialists and decision-makers to share experiences. 
I am grateful to the many experts who have come to share their knowledge and face challenges in 
implementation of Industry 4.0. 
 
 
ICTTE 2018 Director 
Dr Olja Cokorilo 
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ENHANCING THE FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY OF PPP PROJECTS WITH 
HYBRID FUNDING  
 
Goran Mladenovic1, Cesar Queiroz2  
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Abstract: In transport infrastructure concessions, the sources of revenue to the private partner (or concessionaire) may include (i) the 
infrastructure users (e.g., tolling, in the case of roads), (ii) the government (e.g. through availability payments), and (iii) both users 
and government, which might be called a hybrid concession. An example of the latter is a road concession where the concessionaire 
is allowed to charge tolls to the road users but, because of relatively low revenues, the government agency might have to complement 
the toll revenue. This paper summarizes the cases where it may be justified for the government to complement users’ revenues and 
describes a model developed for the financial assessment of road concessions involving both tolling and government payments. The 
methodology described for roads can also be applied to other forms of transport infrastructure. A practical application of the model is 
demonstrated in the paper. For example, given traffic volumes and maximum acceptable toll rates for a particular road project, the 
model can be used to estimate the minimum availability payment that would be required for the project to attract private sector 
interest, that is, potential bidders in a competitive bidding scenario. The model can also be used to carry out sensitivity analyses of 
the impact of key input parameters on outputs such as the investor’s return on equity and annual debt service cover ratio.  
 
Keywords: PPP, road concessions, tolling, availability payments, financial feasibility. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last couple of decades there has been an important contribution of the private sector to finance roads and other 
forms of infrastructure. In 2017, private investment commitments in energy, transport, ICT and water infrastructure in 
low- and middle-income countries totaled US$93.3 billion across 304 projects (World Bank, 2017). Private investment 
commitments in developed countries have also been substantial.  
Driving policy makers’ continued interest in attracting private financing to transportation projects is the need for greater 
investments to keep transport infrastructure in acceptable condition and carry out required expansions in a context of 
public budget constraints. When arrangements for private participation or, more generally, public-private partnerships 
(PPP) are designed well, they can lead to (Mladenovic and Queiroz, 2014): 
(1) Greater financial efficiency, by leveraging public money through the mobilization of private capital, reducing 
the impact of investments in infrastructure on the fiscal budget, and creating fiscal space to expand public 
service delivery in other sectors; 
(2) Better distribution of risks, by transferring design, construction, and performance risks to the private sector, 
which is best able to manage such risks; and 
(3) Better governance, by increasing the accountability of the service provider through competitive bidding, 
disclosure policies, and public reporting.  
 
Government support to potential PPP projects is justified when an economically feasible project does not offer, without 
such support, the financial benefits required to attract private concessionaires. The mixing of public and private funding 
to get projects completed is a way to leverage scarce public resources, not just replace them. Because transport 
infrastructure is so essential to a well-functioning, growing economy, it is vital that subsidy funding is well spent and 
helps to deliver infrastructure services people really need at the least possible cost (World Bank, 2012). 
How a government contributes financial support to a concession project, and how much it contributes, are often limited 
to what is required to attract private financing and promote the success of the project (World Bank, 2012). Mechanisms 
that governments use to support private financing of roads include (Queiroz et al. 2013):  
• Availability payment, which is paid to the concessionaire by the government on the basis of the availability and 
quality of the required capacity (e.g., number of lanes in acceptable condition), regardless of demand (e.g., traffic 
volume).  
• Capital grants, or subsidies, to cover part of the construction cost. Where user charges (e.g., toll revenue) would 
not be enough to recover the full construction cost of a project, reducing the privately financed construction cost 
may make the project financially attractive to the private sector. 
• A per-vehicle subsidy (a toll subsidy) which is paid to the concessionaire based on traffic volume. 
• Minimum revenue guarantees, in which the government pays the concessionaire compensation if revenue falls 
below a specified minimum (for example, 90 percent of the expected amount).  
 
Recent practice in transport projects has seen the use of a mixed payment mechanism consisting of an availability 
payment and a direct user charge, or toll (Yescombe, 2007). Such an arrangement is designed to cover operating 
expenses, debt service and equity return.  
                                                            
1 Corresponding author: emladen@imk.grf.bg.ac.rs  
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There are several toolkits available for the analysis and ex-ante assessment of highway PPP projects. These toolkits 
provide a wide range of tools and manuals that may assist stakeholders involved in PPP projects from early phases of 
project development to financial closure and implementation, as summarized below.  
The Government of India (2010) released a web-based toolkit for the improvement of the decision-making process in 
PPP arrangements for the delivery of infrastructure projects. The toolkit can be used for the assessment of highway 
projects, which is one of five sectors covered. It is suitable for detailed analysis of greenfield and brownfield projects. 
The primary resources of revenues considered are user charges, shadow tolls, or annuities. Results consist of a set of 
accounting ratios such as debt service coverage ratio, loan life cover ratio, return on assets, net profit margin, and return 
on equity. Also, results cover a set of output parameters related to the project such as the project’s internal rate of return 
and net present value, and shareholder accounts, such as the equity internal rate of return and the equity net present 
value.    
Beaty and Lieu (2012) developed an Early-Stage Toll Revenue Estimation Model. The model is standalone, 
spreadsheet-based, and prepares early stage traffic and toll revenue estimates, and allows a user to simultaneously 
examine the interaction of multiple tolling variables and traffic scenarios, so the agencies can make an informed 
decision about future toll road projects.   
In 2013, the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Office of Innovative Program Delivery launched a new 
toolkit, P3-Value, Public-Private Partnership Value-for-Money Analysis for Learning and Understanding Evaluation 
(FHWA, 2013). Although the main purpose of the toolkit is to help decision makers in the “value-for-money” analysis, 
it covers other important aspects of PPPs such as risk evaluation and financial feasibility. This toolkit consists of four 
tools, namely a risk analysis tool, a public sector comparator (PSC) tool, a shadow bid tool, and a financial assessment 
tool, all Microsoft Excel based and supported by associated manuals. 
The World Bank (WB), supported by the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), has developed a 
Toolkit for Public-Private Partnership in Roads and Highways (PPIAF, 2009) - the Toolkit - to assist policy makers in 
implementing procedures to promote private sector participation and financing in roads. The WB Toolkit includes 
financial models (in graphical and numerical formats) that can be used for the financial assessment of PPP toll roads. 
Based on the Toolkit toll road graphical financial model, a model was developed to assess the financial feasibility of 
road concessions involving availability payments (Mladenovic and Queiroz, 2014).  
This paper focuses on availability payments (also called annuities, as in South Asia), as a complement to toll revenues, 
where such revenues are not enough for the project to attract private partners. This would occur, for example, because 
of relatively low traffic volumes and/or toll rates. The paper presents the development of a user-friendly tool for 
financial assessments of road concession projects that involve both tolling and availability payments based on the 
existing World Bank Toolkit (2009) and the model for availability payments (Mladenovic and Queiroz, 2014). In view 
of the brief summary provided above on existing financial models, as well as a comprehensive related literature review 
carried out by Vajdic (2016), it appears that the new model will fill an important gap in the set of tools available for the 
financial assessment of road PPPs or concessions.    
Several practical applications of the model are demonstrated in the paper. For example, given traffic volumes and 
maximum acceptable toll rates for a particular road project, the model can be used to estimate the minimum availability 
payment that would be required for the project to attract private sector interest, that is, potential bidders in a competitive 
bidding scenario. The model can also be used to carry out sensitivity analyses of the impact of key input parameters 
(e.g. capital cost, concession life, loan terms) on outputs such as the investor’s return on equity and annual debt service 
cover ratio.  
While launching a concession project that involves availability payments (AP), a country should be aware that AP 
creates future liability for the government, and hence limits its future resources to invest in other needed projects. 
Nevertheless, when a “users pay” type of project is not feasible (due, for example, to user inability or unwillingness to 
pay the minimum required toll rate), AP may be used to complement the limited toll revenues.      
 
2. Developing a Financial Model for Tolling and Availability Payment Concessions  
 
Based on the WB Toolkit toll road graphical financial model, a model was developed to assess the financial feasibility 
of road concessions involving both tolling and availability payments.  
As in the original model, the new financial model comprises five worksheets (Data Sheet, Cash Flow Graph, Debt 
Graph, Dividend Graph, and Summary of Assumptions and Results), the main functions and outputs of which are 
described in the next sections. Default values are provided for each parameter defining a hypothetical road concession 
project. The user can change the parameter values using the arrow keys (scroll bars) provided in the Data Sheet and 
Cash Flow Sheet (or any of the other graph sheets), to define the project to be financially assessed.  
The Data Sheet (Figure 1) summarizes the main characteristics (assumptions) of the PPP project. A few assumptions, 
identified by arrow keys, can be changed using this sheet. The other key characteristics can be changed directly from 
any of the graph sheets. 
Two types of loan repayment are incorporated in the model: 
• P+I constant: A constant amount (including Reimbursement of Capital and Interest) is paid each year; 
• Linear: The same amount of capital is reimbursed each year. The interest is calculated from the non-reimbursed 
capital.  
 
– 593 –
 
Fig. 1.  
Data Sheet 
 
The duration of works can vary from 1 to 5 years. The user enters the duration of works and default values for 
distribution of works are displayed. The user can modify the default values by using the scrolling bars. The percentage 
of the first year is calculated as: 100% - sum (% year 2 to % year 5).  
The capitalized items are assumed to be depreciated on a straight-line basis throughout the amortization period. The 
amortization period is equal to, or less than, the difference between the concession life and the construction period. 
The operation costs include all operating and maintenance costs that are incurred during the operation period (i.e., from 
completion of the construction period until the end of the concession period). The operation cost is expressed in terms 
of the annual equivalent amount of all operation, maintenance and rehabilitation costs during the operation period. The 
operation costs are adjusted for inflation every year.  
State discount rate is the rate used to calculate the present value (PV) of government cash flows. The user should input 
the state discount rate in real terms (DRr). The model then computes the state discount rate in nominal terms (DRn) 
through the formula: 
100
InflationDRInflationDRDR rrn ⋅++=          (1) 
 
The Cash Flow Graph (Figure 2) represents the concession company cash flows during the concession period. They 
are classified by order of repayment priority: Operation costs > Taxes > Debt service > Dividends > Shareholders 
account. 
The shareholder account represents a bank account controlled by the company shareholders (fiscal restrictions generally 
limit the authorized distribution of dividends to the project net income) to which the cash balance is transferred (or 
drawn from if negative) until it can be distributed as dividends. 
When the shareholders' account is insufficient to service the debt, shareholders have to fill the gap and this appears in 
the graph in the form of negative dividends. 
The Debt Graph (Figure 3) represents, for the first 30 years of the concession period, separately on the left and right 
vertical axes, respectively: 
• Annual payment of principal and interest during the debt servicing period (grace period + repayment period); 
• The two main bank ratios over the repayment period: Annual Debt Service Coverage Ratio (ADSCR) and Loan 
Life Coverage Ratio (LLCR).  
 
The ADSCR represents, for any operating year, the ability of the project company to cover/repay the debt taking into 
account the assumptions made in the model. This ratio is determined as follows: 
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Cash Flow Graph 
 
i
i
i DS
CBDSADSCR =             (2) 
where: 
CBDSi  - the net cash flow before debt service in year i (i.e., the amount of cash remaining in the project company after 
operating costs and taxes have been paid), and 
DSi  - the debt service to be paid in year i (principal and interests). 
 
The project is considered viable for the lenders when the ADSCR is greater than 1. If a margin of say 20% is deemed 
appropriate, then the ADSCR should be at least 1.20, for every year of the project life. This means that if, for whatever 
reason, the project revenue is 20% below what has been forecast in the financial model for a given year, the project 
company should still be able to repay the debt in that year. In high risk circumstances, a minimum ADSCR of 1.4 is 
sometimes used. 
The LLCR indicates, for any operating year, the capacity for the project company to bear an occasional shortfall of cash 
while maintaining its debt service to the end of the debt. This ratio is calculated as follows: 
( )
endDS
endCBDSNPVLLCR
i
i
i →
→
=          (3) 
where: 
NPV (CBDSi→end) -  the present value of the net cash flow before debt service from year i to the end of the debt 
repayment period, and 
DSi→end - the total of debt service remaining at year i (principal and interests). 
 
 
Fig. 3.  
Debt Graph 
 
The project is considered viable for the lenders when the LLCR is higher than 1 (in practice usually higher than 1.3) for 
every year of the project life. The ADSCR and LLCR are used by the lenders to check the project capacity to repay debt 
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in adverse scenarios, including if revenues are below forecasted levels. Nominal interest rate is used to calculate the 
annual interest paid. 
The Dividend Graph (Figure 4) displays, for the first 30 years of the concession period, respectively on the left and 
right vertical axes: 
• The equity mobilized by company shareholders during the construction period and the dividends received by 
them during the operation period. 
• The two main financial indicators over the concession: the financial Internal Rate of Return of the project 
(Project IRR) and the Equity IRR. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  
Dividend Graph 
 
The model allows a rapid verification that Project IRR is independent from the project financial structure (i.e., the 
proportion of subsidies, equity, and loan) while Equity IRR is directly related to it. 
The assumptions and results of the project financial assessment are summarized on the Summary of Assumptions and 
Results sheet, presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  
Summary of Assumptions and Results Sheet  
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Each one of the three graphs (Figures 2 to 4) displays five key project financial indicators:  
• Project IRR – the project financial Internal Rate of Return for the concession period (in real terms);  
• ROE – the Return on Equity for the concession period (in real terms);  
• Minimum ADSCR - the minimum Annual Debt Service Coverage Ratio; 
• Minimum LLCR - the minimum Loan Life Coverage Ratio; 
• PV – present value of the net financial contribution from government. The government pays the required annual 
availability payment (or annuities) to the concessionaire and may also pay subsidies during the construction 
period, and recovers corporate taxes and VAT during the operation period. The indicator shows the present value 
the financial balance for the government throughout the concession period. When PV is zero, the project is 
fiscally neutral for the government. If PV is negative, it is shown in red in the graph sheets. The tax amounts 
(corporate tax and VAT) are considered positive (for this purpose), while government payments are considered 
negative.  
 
Fifteen key project characteristics (Figure 6) can be modified in any of the three graphs. Following any change in 
parameters, all the worksheets are automatically updated. The ranges of variables included in the model reflect realistic 
conditions in most projects. When required, such ranges can be changed by model specialists. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  
Key Project Characteristics 
 
Comments are triggered by the model to inform of unrealistic or impossible data entries. For example, if the concession 
life is set at a value less than the debt maturity, a message is displayed to alert the user and the model automatically 
corrects the debt maturity to ensure consistency. Comments are also provided if results deemed unfeasible are obtained 
(e.g., ADSCR less than 1.2). 
 
3. Numerical Example 
 
Assuming that previous studies have shown that a proposed PPP project to build a road is economically justified, and 
socially and environmentally sound, the following numerical example shows how the financial model can be used to 
estimate the minimum Annual Availability Payment that a potential concessionaire will require from the government to 
undertake the project. Table 1 provides a summary of data for the proposed PPP project. 
 
Table 1  
Example of basic assumptions used to estimate the minimum availability payment for a PPP project to attract private 
investors 
A. Project Parameters  
Concession term: 30 years 
Construction cost: $170 million  
Capital structure: Equity, 25%; Subsidies, 10%; Loans, 65% 
Three-year construction period, with progress rates of: 
Year 1: 30%; Year 2: 40%; Year 3: 30%  
Initial traffic: 12,200 vehicles per day 
Traffic growth rate: 2% 
Maximum acceptable toll rate (VAT included): $5.0 per vehicle per 100 km 
Operating expenses: $8 million per year (at opening year) plus variable expenses of $0.1 per vehicle 
Discount rate (real terms): 6% 
Inflation=4% per year 
Tax rates: (a) VAT: 15%; (b) Corporate tax: 20% 
Amortization period: 27 years 
B. Loan Terms  
Nominal Interest rate=7% per year 
Loan grace period: 3 years;  
Loan repayment period=15 years 
 
Let us also assume that the following targets (or constraints) will have to be met for the project to be able to attract 
private investors: 
• Equity Internal Rate of Return (or Return on Equity):   ROE ≥ 14% 
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• Annual Debt Service Cover Ratio:       ADSCR ≥ 1.2. 
 
The model can now be used to estimate the minimum Annual Availability Payment that a potential concessionaire will 
require from the government to undertake the project. As a first step, the user should enter the data provided using both 
the Data and the Cash Flow Graph worksheets.  
The user can now go to the Cash Flow Graph and obtain the minimum Annual Availability Payment ($ million) by trial 
and error, by varying the Availability Payment so that the financial indicators calculated by the model are equal to or 
just above the minimum required threshold for ROE and ADSCR. By doing this, the user should find that an 
Availability Payment of $6 million (VAT included) is the minimum amount that would satisfy the two indicators.  
In conclusion, an Annual Availability Payment of $6 million (in the first year of operation, in present value terms); 
payments in subsequent years would be adjusted according to inflation) should be able to attract private investors. The 
corresponding two financial indicators are ROE = 14.68%, and ADSCR = 1.3. 
The financial model, as currently developed, does not directly address the uncertainty in model parameters, such as 
construction cost and traffic and revenue forecasts. Nevertheless, the model can be used to carry out sensitivity 
analyses. The user can change the value of an input parameter (e.g., construction cost) and obtain the resulting impact 
on the financial indicators. For example, if the construction cost increases to $200 million, ROE would reduce to 
11.92% and ADSCR to 1.06, which would turn the project not financially feasible (according to the financial targets 
adopted above).  
Similarly, the amount of availability payment can be adjusted to keep the project financial indicators at an acceptable 
level. Table 2 and Figure 7 present the needed availability payment if construction cost varies in the range from $140 
million to $200 million. 
 
Table 2  
Needed availability payment as a function of construction cost  
Construction 
cost  
(MUSD) 
Availability 
payment 
(MUSD) 
Project IRR  
(%) 
Equity IRR  
(%) ADSCR LLCR 
140 2 8.17 14.47 1.24 1.73 
155 4 8.17 14.59 1.27 1.74 
170 6 8.16 14.68 1.3 1.75 
185 8 8.16 14.76 1.32 1.76 
200 10 8.15 14.83 1.34 1.76 
 
 
Fig. 7.  
Variation of needed Availability payment with change of construction cost 
 
Such a simplified model is particularly useful when only preliminary project data is available.   
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper focused on availability payments (also called annuities, as in South Asia), as a complement to toll revenues, 
where such revenues are not enough for the project to attract private partners. This would occur, for example, because 
of relatively low traffic volumes and/or toll rates. The paper presented the development of a user-friendly model to 
assess the financial feasibility of road concessions that include tolling and availability payments. The tool is based on 
the graphical financial model of the Toolkit for Public Private Partnership in Roads and Highways, which was 
developed by the World Bank. 
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper focused on availability payments (also called annuities, as in South Asia), as a complement to toll revenues, 
where such revenues are not enough for the project to attract private partners. This would occur, for example, because 
of relatively low traffic volumes and/or toll rates. The paper presented the development of a user-friendly model to 
assess the financial feasibility of road concessions that include tolling and availability payments. The tool is based on 
the graphical financial model of the Toolkit for Public Private Partnership in Roads and Highways, which was 
developed by the World Bank. 
Based on a comprehensive related literature review, it appears that the new model will fill an important gap in the set of 
tools available for the financial assessment of road PPPs or concessions.    
A practical application of the model was demonstrated in the paper. For a set of road project parameters, traffic volume 
and maximum acceptable toll rate, the model was used to estimate the minimum availability payment that would be 
required for the project to attract private sector interest, that is, potential bidders in a competitive bidding scenario. The 
model can also be used to carry out sensitivity analyses. The user can change the value of an input parameter (e.g., 
construction cost) and obtain the resulting impact, for example, on the investor’s return on equity and annual debt 
service cover ratio. Such a simplified model is particularly useful when only preliminary project data is available. 
 
References  
 
Beaty, C.; Lieu, H. 2012. Development of an Early-Stage Toll Revenue Estimation Model. UTCM project #09-22-02, 
Texas Transportation Institute, College Station, TX, USA. 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). 2013. P3-Value: Financial Assessment Tool User Manual. Innovative 
Program Delivery, U.S. Department of Transportation.  
Government of India. 2010. PPP Toolkit for Improving PPP Decision-Making Processes. Public Private Partnerships in 
India, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.  
Mladenovic, G.; Queiroz, C. 2014. Assessing the Financial Feasibility of Availability Payment PPP Projects. In 
Proceedings of the T&DI Second Congress, 2014, June 8-11, 2014 in Orlando, FL, USA, 602-611. Paper ID #260, 
2014. Available from Internet: <http://ascelibrary.org/doi/book/10.1061/9780784413586>. 
PPIAF. 2009. Toolkit for Public-Private Partnerships in Roads and Highways. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility. Available from Internet: <https://ppiaf.org/documents/2066?ref_site=ppiaf>. (Accessed August 6, 2018). 
Queiroz, C.; Izaguirre, A.K. 2008. Worldwide Trends in Private Participation in Roads: Growing Activity, Growing 
Government Support. Gridlines series No. 37, PPIAF, Washington, D.C. 
Queiroz, C.; Vajdic, N.; Mladenovic, G. 2013. Public–private partnerships in roads and government support: trends in 
transition and developing economies, Transportation Planning and Technology, 36(3): 231-243. 
Vajdic, 2016. N. Stochastic Model for the Assessment of Acceptable Toll Rate. Doctoral Dissertation. University of 
Belgrade, Serbia. 
World Bank. 2009. Toolkit for Public-Private Partnerships in Roads and Highways, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
World Bank. 2012. Best Practices in Public-Private Partnerships Financing in Latin America: the role of subsidy 
mechanisms. Washington D.C. 
World Bank. 2017. Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Annual Report. World Bank IPG Group. Available from 
Internet: <http://ppi.worldbank.org/~/media/GIAWB/PPI/Documents/Global-Notes/PPI_2017_AnnualReport.pdf>. 
(Accessed August 6, 2018)  
Yescombe, E.R. 2007. Public-Private Partnerships: Principles of Policy and Finance. Elsevier. 
– 599 –
